


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
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USSR-Cyprus: Makarios Seeks
Stronger Soviet Backing

President Makarios is working hard to get stronger support from Moscow on the Cyprus question in hopes of using the Soviets as a lever against the Turks. While Moscow will welcome the opportunity to play a greater role in the Cyprus negotiations, it will be reluctant to jeopardize its relations with Turkey by playing Makarios' game.



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The Soviets will be constrained in responding to Makarios by their continuing interest in not antagonizing the Turks. A statement issued by the Soviet news agency Tass on February 16 regarding the Turkish Cypriot declaration of autonomy was mild, avoiding direct criticism of Ankara. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official was similarly noncommittal in responding to a Greek request for more active Soviet support. Moscow has even more reason to exploit its relationship with Ankara now that the US aid cut-off has brought into question US use of Turkish military facilities.

Moscow is also wary of dealing with the Archbishop and will be suspicious of his willingness actually to grant the USSR a lasting role in the Cypriot situation. Nonetheless, the Soviets will probably seek to strengthen their hand with Makarios, particularly since their view of the solution for Cyprus tends to coincide with that of the Archbishop.



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US-GDR Relations: An East German Perspective

East Germany's ambassador to the US--back in Pankow for a conference last week--told Ambassador Cooper that he is relatively optimistic about the prospects for relations with Washington.

Although he was mildly critical of some articles on East Germany in the US press, Ambassador Sieber was enthusiastic about his current assignment and stressed that party chief Honecker, with whom he said he had recently spoken, "earnestly desires" good relations with the US.

Sieber said that his government attaches "great importance" to the recently opened negotiations on the consular convention. These talks must deal with the knotty problem of defining East German citizenship--a priority concern to Pankow. Sieber expressed hope that the negotiations could be successfully concluded by the first anniversary of diplomatic relations in September.

The East German also discussed his country's special interest in expanded trade and technological transfer with the US. In order to increase commerce "as expeditiously as possible," Sieber pushed for discussions to start this year on an inter-governmental trade agreement which, he claimed, the East German economic system "virtually requires." He hoped that a substantial increase in trade with the US could be built into his country's next five year plan (1976-80), and that more East German trade delegations, particularly in the areas of machine tools and chemicals, would be invited to the US.

To underscore his government's good faith, Sieber mentioned the progress that had been made on five humanitarian emigration cases and reminded Ambassador Cooper that he will continue to have access to high officials including Premier Sindermann.

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Notes on the Cultural Scene: Establishment
Flirts with the Unconventional

Developments in official Soviet culture are generally overshadowed in the West by the struggle of dissident artists against the sterility of "socialist realist" dogma and for the freedom of artistic expression. Establishment culture, however, has its own fringe elements, which occasionally probe the limits of official tolerance.

This narrow realm of adventurous official art has had unusual public exposure since mid-December. On December 14, the Moscow Composers Union presented a concert that included the less-than-conventional works of three young Soviet composers. One of these--the Ukrainian, Silvestrov--has been hailed in the West as a major member of the tiny avant garde school of music in the USSR; his work ended with the violinist striking the piano with the bow and the pianist lighting a wooden match. Three days later the Composers Union put on another concert by a different group of avant gardists; the standing-room-only audience included many prominent establishment figures and the frail Dmitri Shostakovich.

On Christmas Eve, the Union opened its concert hall to the "big band" of Honored Artist of the RSFSR Oleg Lundstrom, which presented a musical tribute to Duke Ellington. The second half of the program was given over to classical jazz by three Moscow ensembles who rarely appear in public. On January 9, the same hall witnessed a concert by Aleksei Kozlov's heavily amplified rock group "Arsenal." Kozlov later called the performance a success, although establishment musicologists whistled and cat-called in the aisles and one critic labeled the show a "scandal."

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The graphic arts and painting were involved in similar unusual developments. An exhibit by book-illustrator Boris Sheines opened on January 14 to show a virtually complete gallery of his drawings of the great artists of the Soviet 1920's avant garde, including Kandinsky, Chagall, Drevin and Lissitzky. Although the works of these artists do not now appear in any major Soviet museum, Sheines' exhibit was closely followed by an official one-day show devoted exclusively to Drevin's works. The Drevin exhibit was heavily attended by cultural figures from the establishment.

What this new and still somewhat timid air of excitement means for official culture--and whether it will be a lasting phenomenon--is not yet clear. It is almost certain, however, that some within intellectual circles will link these developments to the appointment in November of candidate Politburo member Demichev as minister of culture. Indeed, the regime's recent attempts to break the unity of Moscow's dissident artists, together with the greater exposure given to official culture's daring fringe, suggest a modification of the traditional carrot-and-stick tactics. Demichev may be trying to divide the dissidents further by demonstrating that there is now enough room within the system for somewhat unconventional, but still politically acceptable art. Those who still choose to stand apart from the establishment then clearly would do so for other than artistic reasons.

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Bulgaria and Portugal: Some Brotherly Advice

If first impressions are lasting, Sofia will have a rough road ahead with the new government in Lisbon.

The Portuguese ambassador in Sofia has reported that the Bulgarians dropped a few ill-chosen comments and displayed little tact during recent talks in Bulgaria between his country's secretary of state for external commerce, Vera Jardim, and the Bulgarian foreign trade minister, Ivan Nedev. The only concrete result of the talks was a long-term trade agreement that includes a most-favored-nation clause. This document has little significance because the Bulgarians came up with nothing to sell.

Difficulties first arose on the matter of Bulgarian assistance to Portugal, which the ambassador described as a "joke." The Bulgarians offered to supply Portugal with fork-lifts and provide aid in shipyard construction and repairs, but were "amazed" to learn that the Portuguese already have these capabilities.

Nedev also gratuitously offered a little brotherly advice on how Sofia handles internal dissidence and popular elections. He claimed that troublesome peasants could be made "quite docile" by taking away their land and cattle, and that it is best "not to have elections too soon" when the people are still "uneducated politically."

Sofia's clumsy actions may have both amused and offended the Portuguese delegation, but the Lisbon government can, if necessary, use the visit to silence possible protests of Portuguese Communists who claim the new regime neglects trade opportunities with Eastern Europe.

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